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ABSTRACT. This article investigates differences in circumpolar indigeneities in three major Arctic nations: Russia, Canada, 
and the United States (Alaska). Russia has different ways of recognizing indigeneity in law, and that definition of indigeneity 
excludes larger Indigenous groups of the Far North (Sakha, Komi), rather than seeing them as ethnic (titular) minorities. This 
study reveals that: 1) not all Indigenous peoples are represented in the Arctic Council; 2) there are historical explanations 
for this underrepresentation; 3) the Arctic Council should include more Indigenous groups as Permanent Participants. The 
equal representation of Indigenous organizations as Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council is important because all 
Indigenous groups in the Arctic should be heard. 
Key words: Arctic Council; Indigenous peoples; representation; autonomy; Permanent Participants; indigeneity; Indigenous 
recognition
RÉSUMÉ. Cet article tente de déterminer s’il y a une différence entre les indigénéités circumpolaires de trois grands acteurs 
de l’Arctique, soit: la Russie, le Canada et les États-Unis (Alaska). En raison de la différence en matière de reconnaissance 
juridique de l’indigénéité en Russie, la définition de l’indigénéité exclut les grands groupes indigènes du Grand Nord (Sakha, 
Komi) et les considère plutôt comme des minorités ethniques (titulaires). Cette étude révèle que: 1) ce ne sont pas tous les 
peuples indigènes qui sont représentés au Conseil de l’Arctique; 2) cette sous-représentation s’explique par des raisons 
historiques; et 3) le Conseil de l’Arctique devrait inclure plus de groupes indigènes à titre de participants permanents. La 
représentation égale des participants permanents (organisations indigènes) au Conseil de l’Arctique est importante, car tous les 
groupes indigènes de l’Arctique devraient avoir la possibilité de se faire entendre. 
Mots clés: Conseil de l’Arctique; peuples indigènes; représentation; autonomie; indigénéité; reconnaissance indigène
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DEFINING THE PROBLEM: WHO IS INDIGENOUS?
The Arctic Council (AC) is the first intergovernmental 
forum to include Indigenous participants in the decision-
making process. This was an important step in the 
understanding and recognition of Indigenous rights. 
However, it is hard to say whether all Indigenous groups in 
the Arctic are represented in the AC. A lack of Indigenous 
representation in the AC might be caused by differences 
in the legal systems of the Arctic states. The Russians 
perceive indigeneity differently from North Americans. 
According to some authors (Slezkine, 1994; Pika, 1999; 
Øverland, 2009), the Russian definition of indigeneity 
focuses on the size of the population, not on the fact of 
conquest. The Soviet Union had a practice of categorizing 
Indigenous groups in the North by separating smaller 
groups in the North from their more developed neighbours. 
The Komi and Sakha are circumpolar and Indigenous 
to their regions, but their population is larger than 50 000 
people (Slezkine, 1994; Pika, 1999; Øverland, 2009). The 
Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of Siberia and 
the Far North (RAIPON) includes only legally recognized 
small Indigenous groups—those numbering fewer than 
50 000 people (RAIPON, 2019). According to federal 
laws, the list of Indigenous groups is established by the 
Government of the Russian Federation (Consultant Plus, 
1999). This governmental decision to legally recognize only 
Indigenous groups with a population below 50 000 people 
has had long-term consequences at the international level, 
such as the lack of recognition of larger Indigenous groups 
from the Far North (English, 2013).
The AC allowed Indigenous organizations to participate 
in the discussion of environmental issues as Permanent 
Participants (PPs) (Tennberg, 2000). Since the beginning, 
RAIPON, has participated in the AC as a PP representing 
small Indigenous groups of the Russian North. However, 
larger Indigenous groups of the Russian Far North, the 
Sakha and Komi, have never been represented in the AC, 
nor within RAIPON as PPs (RAIPON, 2019). In fact, the 
AC has never included all Indigenous participants from the 
Russian Far North.
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I analyzed three case studies—the United States 
(Alaska), Canada, and Russia—to support my argument 
that indigeneity in the Arctic is being defined by the 
member states, not by the international community. These 
case studies also illustrate that Indigenous identities 
were affected by historical circumstances as well as 
by governmental ideologies, and that there is no single 
definition or understanding of indigeneity in the Arctic.
U.S. (Alaska)
Because Alaska was ceded to the United States later 
than other American states and has always been a remote 
territory, Alaska Natives were recognized as Indigenous 
much later than Native Americans. After the purchase 
of Alaska from the Russian Empire, Article III of the 
1867 Treaty of Cession provided a distinction between 
“uncivilized tribes” and the other “inhabitants of the ceded 
territory.” The “uncivilized” category was determined 
either by Russian classification or by U.S. law (Anderson, 
2007; Case and Voluck, 2012:165). Although the federal 
Indian legislation was applicable to Alaska Natives, their 
legal status was unclear until the beginning of the 20th 
century. Many federal statutes, such as the Indian Trade 
and Intercourse Act, were not applied to Alaskan lands until 
1948. The 1884 Organic Act prevented Alaska Natives from 
making claims of Aboriginal title. Furthermore, because 
of the lack of a separate Native agency in Alaska, the 
Department of the Interior held that the federal government 
treated Alaska Natives differently from other Native 
Americans (Case and Voluck, 2012). Finally, in 1936, 
Congress issued amendments to the Indian Reorganization 
Act (IRA) in regard to Alaska that generally equated the 
legal status of Alaska Natives to that of Native Americans 
(Case and Voluck, 2012).
Anderson (2007) and Case and Voluck (2012) note 
that the amendments to the IRA were created to regulate 
government power and land ownership for Alaska Natives 
in the same ways as for Native American reservations. 
By 1941, the Department of the Interior had organized 75 
Indigenous groups under the IRA amendments (Case and 
Voluck, 2012). These amendments were intended to identify 
Alaska Native communities according to the lands that they 
occupied. The organization of Alaska Native governments 
made their status equal with that of Indigenous governments 
generally. By the time of Alaska’s statehood in 1959, both 
the courts and the Congress recognized the historical 
equality of Alaska Native governments’ internal authority 
with Native governments in the lower 48 states (Case and 
Voluck, 2012). However, despite the clarification of the 
status of tribal governments in Alaska, the territory that 
fell under their jurisdiction was not clearly identified. Even 
though the IRA governments could deliver social services 
to their residents, they could not provide police, taxing, 
and other authorities simply because of the lack of clearly 
defined boundaries. Hence, the IRA Act was not enough to 
regulate the life of Alaska Natives (Case and Voluck, 2012).
The adoption of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement 
Act (ANCSA) significantly influenced the relationships 
between the Indigenous groups of Alaska and the 
government (Anderson, 2007; Case and Voluck, 2012). The 
amendments to ANCSA in 1988 ensured Alaska Natives’ 
access to federal programs designed for Indigenous groups 
(Case and Voluck, 2012). However, the legal status of 
tribal governance in Alaska is not the same as in the rest 
of the country (Anderson, 2007; Case and Voluck, 2012). 
According to the U.S. Supreme Court interpretation, 
ANCSA effectively removed inherent tribal authority 
over land (Case and Voluck, 2012). As Anderson (2007) 
notes, the issue of tribal sovereignty was never seriously 
discussed. However, the tribal governments in Alaska 
are still able to provide social services to the residents of 
their communities (Case and Voluck, 2012). The Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA) of the U.S. Department of the Interior 
deals with regulations pertaining to Alaska Natives. The 
criteria of indigeneity described by the BIA include several 
requirements: 1) to establish that the person has a lineal 
ancestor who is an Alaska Native; 2) if so, to identify which 
tribe he/she was affiliated with; and 3) to document the 
relationships to that ancestor (Case and Voluck, 2012).
Canada
Like Alaska Natives, the Canadian Inuit were recognized 
as an Indigenous group later than other communities, in this 
case First Nations and Métis. The British North America 
Act (BNA Act) made the federal government responsible 
for providing social services for the Indigenous peoples of 
Canada (Shadian, 2014). The Indian Act of 1876 authorized 
federal Indian Agents to oversee Indigenous peoples’ 
activity in order to help them adapt to non-Indigenous 
society. Although Inuit were exempt from this Act, some 
of its provisions affected them as well. For instance, Inuit 
formed one of three Indigenous groups. The other two, 
First Nations and Métis, were forbidden to appeal against 
Canada without permission from the federal government 
in Ottawa. In 1939, the Supreme Court of Canada issued a 
decision that categorized Inuit as an Indigenous group of 
Canada. The BNA Act, the Indian Act, and further policies 
were based on the understanding of Indigenous peoples as 
backward (Shadian, 2014).
According to one of these policies, the 1941 Eskimo 
disc list system, each Inuit received a four-digit number 
engraved on a disc to be worn around the neck (Innuksuk, 
cited in Shadian, 2014). This process assigned family names 
and a district designation. The government attempted to 
keep track of each Inuk, and later attempted to administer 
government programs designed for the Inuit using this 
policy (Shadian, 2014). The Eskimo disc list system not only 
served to identify the Inuit, but also created criteria for their 
status that were generated entirely within a bureaucratic 
framework. Although the criteria designed by the Canadian 
government were based on racial descent and included 
marital status, cultural identification (“follows an Inuit 
INDIGENEITY IN CANADA, RUSSIA, AND ALASKA • 73
way of life”), self-identification (“wishes to follow the Inuit 
way of life”), and acceptance of tribal members, the final 
decision was always made by the administration (Smith, 
1993:65). Smith (1993:65) called Inuit status created by this 
policy an “inauthentic ethnic category.” In other words, the 
government decided who is qualified to be an Inuk, instead 
of relying on tribal members and self-determination (Smith, 
1993). The disc also automatically identified the Indigenous 
status of the owner. Smith gives an example of a man who 
was issued a disc as an Inuk, but subsequently had the disc 
taken from him because his father was not Inuit. At this 
time, he had lived most of his life as an Inuk, and wished 
to continue living this way. He asked for the disc to be 
returned to him, as he had lost the opportunities associated 
with the legal status of Inuit (Smith, 2003).
The global process of decolonization influenced the views 
of the Canadian government (Smith, 1993). In 1944, Ottawa 
created the Family Allowance program for all Canadians. 
According to the terms of this policy, Inuit could receive 
subsidies for the education of their children if they settled 
near a trading post or sent their younger children to residential 
schools. This program defined an Inuk as “a person who is 
listed as an Eskimo on the roll of records of, and to whom 
an identification disc has been issued by, the Bureau of 
Northwest Territories and Yukon Affairs of the Department 
of Mines and Resources” (“Family Allowances Regulations” 
cited in Smith, 1993:59). The 1947 Canadian Citizenship Act 
recognized Inuit as Canadian citizens. However, Inuit and 
other residents of Northwest Territories could not vote in 
federal elections until 1962 (Loukacheva, 2007).
After the Second World War, the Canadian government 
forced Inuit to move to permanent settlements in order 
to make social welfare accessible. By the mid-1960s, the 
Inuit population was concentrated around these settlements 
(Shadian, 2014). In 1969 the Canadian government issued 
the White Paper on Indian Policy, which rejected the 
former approach taken by the Indian Act. The White Paper 
was mostly aimed at assimilating Indigenous groups into 
mainstream Canadian society. First, land claims and treaties 
were rejected. Second, this act set up regular provincial 
agencies, instead of specialized bodies, to provide services 
for Indigenous groups. However, after the Calder decision 
in 1973, Aboriginal title was reaffirmed (Zellen, 2008). The 
Calder decision and the failure of the White Paper stimulated 
the formation of Inuit political associations. In 1976 Inuit 
Tapirisat of Canada (now Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami) asked the 
federal government to create Nunavut as a part of modern-
day treaties of Inuit land claims in the Northwest Territories. 
Finally, Canada’s 1982 Constitution Act recognized Inuit as 
Indigenous people, distinct from First Nations people, giving 
them opportunities for land claims and self-governance 
(Zellen, 2008). 
Russia
The history of colonization also affected the legal 
recognition of indigeneity by the Russian/Soviet 
governments. In fact, the legal definition of indigeneity in 
Russia was reconsidered after the October Revolution and 
deeply impacted by Communist ideology. 
According to Slocum (1998:173), the term “inorodtsy,” 
or “aliens,” was introduced into Russian legislation in 1822, 
when the Decree about the Governance over aliens was 
adopted. The term originated during the reign of Catherine 
the Great, when activities of the Crown intensified in 
Russian Asia. Although most of Siberia was attached to 
the Empire in the 16th and 17th centuries, the government 
began to consider a more “supple and pragmatic” policy 
only in Catherine’s time (Slocum, 1998:178). The political 
views of Catherine, originally a Prussian princess, were 
strongly tied to the Enlightenment, when the transition to a 
sedentary lifestyle was considered a forward step in social 
evolution. The nomadic non-Russian groups of Siberia were 
differentiated from ethnic Russians in the eastern part of 
the Empire (Slocum, 1998).
It is also important to note that the history of Russian 
colonization of Siberia and the Far East affected the 
understanding of indigeneity. Øverland (2009) argues that, 
unlike North American colonization, Russia’s influence 
in Siberia and the Far East did not occur at a particular 
moment in history. Russian colonization was gradual and 
took place over several hundred years (Øverland, 2009). 
Furthermore, by considering particular groups of peoples 
as Indigenous, the Soviet and then the Russian governments 
were giving special attention to small-numbered Indigenous 
groups and excluding groups from other parts of Russia, for 
instance, the Caucasus Mountains (Øverland, 2009). Small 
northern Indigenous groups were considered Indigenous 
(Slezkine, 1994).
The first attempts to regulate the status of Siberian 
nomads started after Catherine’s death, when governor-
general Mikhail Speransky returned to St. Petersburg 
after his service in Siberia. Speransky initiated this project 
in 1821 and finished it in 1822. The Decree on Aliens 
divided aliens into three categories: settled, nomadic, and 
wandering. The settled aliens were considered “civilized” 
in the same way as the general population. Thus, they 
obtained the same rights and responsibilities, and paid 
the same taxes (Slocum, 1998:179). Also, according to the 
Decree, nomads paid a fur tax (iasak) and local taxes; the 
wandering aliens paid only local taxes. The traditional 
tribal governance of nomadic and wandering aliens was 
introduced as a new structure of governmental institutions 
(Slocum, 1998).
Despite their settled status, Jewish people were also 
categorized as aliens, because of their non-Christian 
religious identity. Unlike Siberian aliens, Jews could not 
change their own alien status (Slocum, 1998). Overall, it is 
hard to say that the Russian Empire recognized Indigenous 
groups as a legal category. The term inorodtsy does not 
mean Indigenous or Native, but rather has a negative 
connotation related to being other, alien, from another clan, 
or even foreign (Slocum, 1998). This explains why the Jews 
were included in the same category. 
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Although the Decree specified only one criterion 
for aliens—a settled way of life—in practice, several 
other factors also determined this status. These could be 
language (although Poles, Estonians, and Lithuanians 
were not Indigenous in the general sense, they spoke their 
Indigenous languages besides Russian), religion (Jews 
were non-Christians), and ethnicity (Siberian Indigenous 
groups were not Slavic). Even Ukrainians were often 
unofficially classified as aliens. This broad definition 
created a discussion about the determination of indigeneity 
in the Russian Empire. The Decree introduced non-Russian 
categories of partial rather than full Indigenous status. 
Slocum (1998) argues that the reason for this separation 
of non-Russians from the regular population was a fear of 
possible attacks on Moscow, which was still part of Russian 
memory. The language, religion, and ethnic differences of 
non-Slavic Russians were seen as foreign elements in the 
political body (Slocum, 1998).
After the October Revolution of 1917, the Decree about 
the Governance of Aliens was cancelled, along with other 
Imperial legal acts. The inception of Marxist ideology 
in society called for educational reform. According to 
the “father of nations,” Joseph Stalin, “only the mother 
tongue can make possible a full development of intellectual 
faculties of the Tatar or of the Jewish worker” (Slezkin, 
1994:418). Lenin suggested the construction of Marxist 
schools with the same curriculum, but with Indigenous 
teachers and Indigenous languages (Slezkine, 1994). The 
term inorodtsy (aliens) was excluded from the official 
language (Slocum, 1998). 
These political views led to the policy called 
korenizatsiia (indigenization), introduced by the Soviet 
government during the 1920s (Slezkine, 1994; Xianzhong, 
2014). Korenizatsiia gave non-Slavic populations privileges 
in education and employment (Slezkine, 1994). At the Tenth 
Party Congress, it was decided to give special assistance 
to non-Slavic groups because they had been oppressed as 
ethnic groups (Slezkine, 1994). The policy was presented 
as a “fixation of forced Russification” provided by Imperial 
Russia (Xianzhong, 2014:46). Korenizatsiia consisted 
of several steps: 1) preference for local people who spoke 
Indigenous languages and knew local traditions and 
customs to be elected in local governments; 2) adoption 
of special legislation that provided use of Indigenous 
languages everywhere in governmental bodies; and 
3) construction of ethnic schools with a unified curriculum 
(Xianzhong, 2014).
Joseph Stalin’s Marxism and the National Question 
(1913) supported Indigenous self-determination and 
promised to preserve the traditional culture and Indigenous 
cultures (Josephson, 2014). In opposition to the imperial 
policy, which mostly ignored the Indigenous population, the 
Soviet government organized the Committee of the North, 
with Peter Smidovich as head. Smidovich initiated the 
creation of the Institute of the People of the North, which 
conducted research on the culture, ethnography, history, 
and folklore of small Indigenous groups (Josephson, 2014). 
After the 1920s the policy of korenizatsiia stopped. The 
government realized that supporting over 192 languages 
and bureaucracies across the country was overwhelming 
(Slezkine, 1994). Moreover, the central authorities became 
suspicious of the high level of ethnic nationalism all over 
the country. For instance, his compatriots considered 
Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko to be a genius, on a level 
with classic Russian writers such as Alexander Pushkin. 
Armenians pointed out that their culture was “one of the 
most ancient cultures of the east” (Slezkine, 1994:446).
 In 1926 the Soviet government issued a statute that 
designated 26 groups as deserving state protection and 
special status. The government identified several criteria 
for them, including language, religion, traditional activities, 
and way of life (Donahoe et al., 2008). Because of the high 
concentration of ethnicities in eastern Russia, lawmakers 
also focused on additional factors such as small population, 
low population density, and remoteness from urban centers 
(Donahoe et al., 2008). In addition to requirements for 
indigeneity mentioned above, the Soviet government included 
a criterion of “backward” socioeconomic development 
(Slezkine, 1994). According to Marxist ideology, the 
socioeconomic development of humanity included several 
stages, and socialism was the desirable one. Thus, the state 
aimed to protect certain groups in order to stimulate their 
socioeconomic development (Donahoe et al., 2008).
Therefore, the policy of korenizatsiia was the main 
reason for the distinction of larger Indigenous groups from 
smaller ones. The larger nations were seen as closer to 
sovereign countries, with their own language, governance, 
and ethnic elite. Another reason for the legal identification 
of Indigenous groups could be their way of life—peoples 
that had what is known as a compact way of living: they 
were settled and less dispersed, had more chances to receive 
autonomous status and, thus, to be excluded from special 
governmental control and protection (Laruelle, 2013). This 
Soviet division between larger and smaller groups was 
copied by the Russian legislation (Laruelle, 2013). 
Russian legislation uses a few criteria to identify ethnic 
groups as Indigenous groups, including lifestyle, livelihood, 
ethnic identity, and population. However, only population 
size is a relatively straightforward requirement in order 
for groups to be considered Indigenous in Russia. Groups 
with a population of less than 50 000 can be considered 
as a smaller Indigenous people (Consultant Plus, 1999). 
Furthermore, larger ethnic groups that are Indigenous, 
including Sakha, Komi, or Chechens, are not included 
in this category because of their population size. Hence, 
larger ethnic groups could be considered as Indigenous in 
a broader sense; however, they are not accorded the same 
rights, benefits, or federal protection as the smaller groups. 
The list of the Arctic Indigenous minorities consists of 
22 ethnicities, except Yakut (Sakha) (478 085 members in 
the 2010 population census); Komis (and Komi-Permiaks) 
(329 111); and Karelians (60 815) (Laruelle, 2013:36). There 
is also a possibility that some small Indigenous groups 
in Russia, such as the Nenets people, could lose their 
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Indigenous status in the future as a result of increases in 
their population (Øverland, 2009).
In summary, despite significant differences in legal and 
political systems, Canada, the United States, and Russia 
created similar governmental policies that were aimed at 
protecting northern Indigenous groups from extinction (the 
Family Allowance Act, the Indian Reorganization Act, and 
korenizatsiia). The territorial remoteness of Indigenous 
groups in circumpolar North America and in Russia 
significantly affected their indigeneity, separating them not 
only from the dominant majority of white North Americans 
and Slavic Russians, but also from other Indigenous groups. 
The most important difference between North 
American and Russian indigeneities lies in the evolution 
of Indigenous-state relationships and the nature of 
colonization. In comparison with colonization in Canada 
and the United States, that process in Siberia and the Far 
East was incremental and slow (Øverland, 2009). The 
main factor in recognizing small Indigenous groups as 
legally Indigenous in Russia had less to do with settler-
Indigenous relationships than with the threat of extinction 
of Indigenous groups (Slezkine, 1994; Øverland, 2009; 
Laruelle, 2013).
AUTONOMY OF NORTHERN INDIGENOUS GROUPS 
Indigenous peoples are unique because they are 
“exceptional,” historically “other,” and distinguishable. 
The experience of colonialism made them distinct in terms 
of their special rights on lands and autonomy (Lindroth, 
2015:31). 
U.S. (Alaska)
Alaska Natives joined the United States much later 
than Native Americans, at the time of the post – Civil War 
assimilation era of federal Native American policy. During 
this period, Native Americans were considered tribes that 
needed to be civilized, which meant that they had to be 
trained and educated to become part of mainstream society. 
This policy of assimilation also affected the lives of Alaska 
Natives when military officers came to Alaska in order to 
enforce federal customs and Native liquor laws (McBeath 
and Morehouse, 1994). The relationship between the U.S. 
government and Alaska Natives was influenced by the 
historical federal experience with Native Americans. From 
1867 to 1912, before Alaska gained territorial status with 
an elected legislature, Congress did not consider Alaska 
Natives in the same way as Native Americans. They could 
not claim Aboriginal title or the same self-governing 
status as Indigenous people in the Lower 48. The Treaty 
of Cession of 1867 was signed as a result of the acquisition 
of Alaska from Russia. Article III of this treaty provided 
a distinction between the Russian inhabitants of Alaska 
and the Indigenous communities. Congress gave Russian 
settlers a choice to go back to Russia or stay in Alaska and 
obtain citizenship in the United States. The Indigenous 
people, however, were considered subject to such laws and 
regulations as the United States may, from time to time, 
adopt in regard to Aboriginal tribes in the lower states. 
However, Alaska did not have statehood until 1959, meaning 
Alaska Natives could not have the same rights as Native 
American tribes in the Lower 48. Thus, the treatment of 
Alaska Native tribes by the federal government could be 
divided into three periods: 1) the early years (1867 – 1934) 
noted above; 2) the middle period from the Indian 
Reorganization Act (1934) to the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act (ANCSA) (1971); and 3) the post-ANCSA 
period (Bankes, 2008:128 – 129). The second period began 
when Congress applied the Indian Reorganization Act (1934) 
to Alaska Natives in 1936, whereby the United States was 
responsible for protecting Native-occupied lands in Alaska 
from acquisition by non-Natives. After the implementation 
of this Act, recognition of Alaska as a state continued this 
idea. The Alaska Statehood Act provided for the protection 
of lands occupied by “Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts” from 
being taken over by the State of Alaska following statehood 
in 1959 (Case and Voluck, 2012:166). The Indigenous lands 
remained under the jurisdiction of the United States. In 
1959, the U.S. Supreme Court case Tee-Hit-Ton Indians 
v. the United States confirmed that Alaska Natives could 
maintain a claim of Aboriginal title. At the same time, the 
Statehood Act granted the State of Alaska 104 million acres 
of land, which the state was eager to take over. Owing to 
controversy surrounding the question of Native ownership 
of much of the land in Alaska, the Secretary of the Interior 
decided to freeze Alaska’s land selections until Native 
land claims were settled (Bankes, 2008). The third period 
began in 1971, when Congress adopted the ANCSA as a 
comprehensive settlement for Alaska Natives. ANCSA was 
called a law of stunning complexity; it vested ownership of 
about 45 million acres of land in 12 regional corporations, 
200 village corporations, and nearly 75 000 native residents, 
and paid nearly one billion dollars to the Alaska Native Fund 
(McBeath and Morehouse, 1994). The settlement dealt only 
with Alaska Native land claims, and did not include other 
Indigenous and environmental issues such as traditional 
resource harvesting, subsistence rights, or self-government. 
Therefore, ANCSA regulated the transfer of Native lands 
to Native-owned corporations, including oil and gas rights. 
ANCSA settled Alaska Natives Aboriginal land claims 
by awarding them fee simple title which granted them 
rights to own, occupy, and use the land they received. For 
the most part, the tribes selected lands in their traditional 
areas (Bankes, 2008). As owners of oil and gas rights, 
regional corporations obtained the right to participate in 
resource extraction and signed agreements with petroleum 
companies.
Canada
There had been a long treaty-making process between 
Indigenous groups and the British Crown before the 
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recognition of Canadian statehood in 1867. The new 
Canadian government carried on this tradition until the 
1920s, but then the Parliament suspended the treaty-making 
process until the 1970s. Canada explained this decision 
by stating that the treaties with Indigenous communities 
were dictated by historical policy of the Crown, and they 
therefore were not the legal responsibility of the new 
government. Thus, new land claims agreements and 
negotiations were stopped (Bankes, 2008). However, 
the Calder decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
1973 confirmed that Indigenous groups of Canada have 
ownership interest in their traditionally occupied lands. 
The position of the federal court in this case led to the 
acceptance of the legal concept of Indigenous title by the 
Canadian government and the creation of a negotiating 
structure with the Indigenous communities (Mason et al., 
2008).
When Nunavut was created in 1999, Inuit leaders selected 
a public form of government instead of self-government. 
Thus, Nunavut has not been officially recognized as having 
Inuit self-government; there is public territorial governance 
for all inhabitants of the area (Loukacheva, 2007). As a 
senior official from Nunavut noted, “Nunavut looks like the 
Inuit government, because the Inuit are the majority right 
now, they control the government” (Loukacheva, 2007:40). 
Thus, the creation of Indigenous autonomy in Canada was 
primarily an Indigenous initiative, a bottom-up approach.
Russia
Unlike in Canada and the United States, the initiative 
of granting autonomy to Indigenous groups began with the 
Soviet government, which was guided by Marxist ideas of 
self-determination. By introducing the korenizatsiia reform, 
the Soviet Union granted autonomy and self-governance to 
some Indigenous groups. Adhering to Marxist ideology, 
the new Soviet government considered the principle of 
“ethnic particularism” as the opposite of capitalism; larger, 
dominant nations were perceived as tools of economic 
expansion (Slezkine, 1994:414). The government promoted 
the construction of the USSR as a large communal 
apartment in which national state units, various republics, 
and autonomous provinces represented “separate rooms” 
(Slezkine, 1994:415). This meant that each nation obtained 
the right to organize its life autonomously and to construct 
federal relations with other nations. The establishment of 
ethno-territorial autonomies for Indigenous groups seemed 
the best option for the implementation of this policy. Some 
nations were considered “backward” and others “civilized”; 
however, they were all considered equal to each other and 
had the same rights (Slezkine, 1994:421). Analyzing the 
degree of their “backwardness,” the government decided 
which type of governance was needed in a particular 
autonomous unit. Some Indigenous groups, such as Sakha 
(Yakuts), received their own government because they 
“lived compactly” and were ready “to organize their lives 
through their own efforts” (Slezkine, 1994:421). 
Therefore, despite the construction of ethnic 
governments within the country, the federal relationships 
in the Soviet Union de facto did not exist. As Stalin 
stated in the North Caucasus in 1920, autonomy does not 
mean separation but a union of the self-ruling mountain 
groups with the people of Russia (Kahn, 2002). Kahn 
(2002:70) argues that autonomy in the Soviet Union meant 
unification, not independence. Even the last leader of the 
USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, publicly announced in 1989 
that the Soviet Union was a centralized and unitary state, 
and that the Soviet people never lived in a federation (Ross, 
2002). In other words, the Soviet Union granted nations 
cultural autonomy, territorial integrity, and symbols of 
statehood, while at the same time, the power of the central 
authority excluded any attempt by these subunits to operate 
separately from the unitary state.
The Russian Federation duplicated the structure of the 
Soviet Union in the logic of the hierarchy between nations, 
when larger ethnicities obtained the right to be considered 
as states, and smaller nations were recognized as 
nationalities and did not have the same privileges (Sakwa, 
2008). Thirty-three ethnicities have their small homeland, 
and 63 do not. The groups that do not have homelands were 
included in other regions, without having their own ethnic 
republic (Sakwa, 2008).
Therefore, because of ideological and historical 
differences between the United States, Canada, and Russia, 
legal and political identities of Indigenous peoples, as 
well as their rights to autonomy, developed in distinct 
ways. By introducing ANCSA, the United States allowed 
Alaska Natives to have corporate bodies to control 
resource extraction on their lands. Canada dealt with 
Indigenous autonomies in a different way, by negotiating 
treaties and, as a result, giving the Inuit the right to govern 
Nunavut, which is largely Indigenous territory. Led by 
the Marxist ideology, the USSR and subsequently Russia, 
organized ethnic autonomies for larger populations of 
Indigenous peoples. These differences show that histories 
of colonialism affected legal recognition of Indigenous 
peoples by creating separate notions of indigeneity. 
THE ARCTIC COUNCIL AND PERMANENT 
PARTICIPANTS
The AC is the intergovernmental forum that promotes 
cooperation and interaction among the countries in 
the Arctic region, Indigenous groups, and other Arctic 
residents. The AC facilitates the discussion on common 
issues in the Arctic, particularly on topics of sustainability 
and protection of the Arctic environment (AC, 2019). The 
creation of the AC was especially important under the 
pressure of growing environmental concerns in the Arctic, 
such as oil spills and contaminants in Arctic waters, as well 
as concerns over the rights of Indigenous groups, such as 
cultural survival and self-determination (Tennberg, 2000; 
English, 2013). The AC was a joint response of the Arctic 
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states to these issues (English, 2013). The recognition 
of the concerns of Indigenous groups in the Arctic over 
environmental issues and self-determination by the state 
governments led to the discussion of direct involvement 
of Indigenous groups in decision-making processes in 
the Arctic (Tennberg, 2000). Unlike other international 
organizations, the AC accepted international Indigenous 
organizations in the discussion of political issues as PPs 
(Wilson and Overland, 2007). Indigenous organizations 
themselves noted that the status given to Indigenous groups 
in the AC is the highest ever granted to any Indigenous 
organizations in the world (Tennberg, 2000). 
The idea of creating the AC was predominantly based 
on a bottom-up principle (the process advanced by civil 
society as opposed to the top-down approach driven by 
national elites [Keskitalo, 2004]) and primarily focused 
on the discussion of environmental issues and Indigenous 
groups (Keskitalo, 2004; Knecht, 2017). Following the 
bottom-up approach, the institutional design of the AC 
brought together not only circumpolar state actors, but also 
Indigenous groups and regional governments, as well as 
non-Arctic states (Keskitalo, 2004). Since the beginning of 
modern international cooperation in the Arctic following 
Gorbachev’s 1987 Murmansk Speech, Indigenous 
involvement in policy-making processes was encouraged 
by many Arctic states, including Finland, the United States, 
Denmark, Canada, and Russia (Tennberg, 2000; Nilsson, 
2009; English, 2013). 
The issue of Indigenous participation was first discussed 
at the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) 
consultative meeting in Rovaniemi in 1989, where the 
need to involve Indigenous groups in Arctic cooperation 
was driven by their negative experience of environmental 
pollution (Tennberg, 2000). Moreover, the participation of 
Indigenous actors was built into the structure of the AC 
because it was assumed that Indigenous participation could 
better address the existing issues in the Arctic (Keskitalo, 
2004; English, 2013). 
After a few meetings with Indigenous communities 
and governmental officials, the AEPS produced a draft 
declaration on the establishment of the Council that 
included international Indigenous organizations in the 
Arctic as PPs in the work of the forum (English, 2013). 
Indigenous organizations received the status of permanent 
observers during the negotiations of the AEPS in 1991, and 
the status of PPs when the AC was established (Huebert, 
cited in Keskitalo, 2004). 
The Ottawa Declaration set up two criteria for PPs. 
Arctic Indigenous organizations with a majority Arctic 
Indigenous constituency are eligible to become PPs if they 
represent: 1) a single Indigenous people resident in more 
than one Arctic state; or 2) more than one Arctic Indigenous 
people resident in a single Arctic state (AC, 1996). 
The formal role of Indigenous groups as PPs allowed 
them involvement in decision-making processes and 
knowledge production (Tennberg, 2000; Nilsson, 2009). 
As a result, the uniqueness of the internal organization of 
the AC significantly influenced the definition of legitimate 
knowledge regarding climate change in the discussion 
of the 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA). 
The PP mechanism of the AC was used during the 2002 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) as a 
model that incorporates principles of genuine partnership 
between states and Indigenous groups (Heinamaki, 2009). 
The PP model provides a unique opportunity to Indigenous 
groups in the Arctic to be heard and to participate in the 
governance of the international Arctic region. Otherwise, 
without state status, Indigenous organizations are usually 
defined as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and have very constrained participation rights in the 
international decision-making process (Tennberg, 2009). 
Since 1991, three major Indigenous organizations have 
been included in international cooperation in the Arctic: 
the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), the Sami Council, 
and the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the 
North (Tennberg, 2000; AC, 2019). Subsequently, these 
organizations were recognized as PPs in the Declaration 
on the Establishment of the AC (AC, 1996). The question 
of adding more PPs in the AC for more comprehensive 
representation was raised a few times. It was decided that 
the number of PPs should, at any time, be less than the 
number of member states (AC, 1996).
However, despite the success of the participation of the 
PPs, the issue of their representation has been difficult from 
the beginning (Tennberg, 2000). Some Indigenous groups in 
Canada and Russia, such as the Dene and the Yakut, felt that 
they were not represented by any organization (Tennberg, 
2000). At the same time, the Canadian delegation noted 
that the PP category is meant “exclusively for Indigenous 
organizations,” so national delegations could not include 
Indigenous groups as members (Tennberg, 2000:40). 
Because of the lack of clarity regarding the eligibility of 
Indigenous organizations, the Russian delegation could 
not decide how many additional groups can qualify as 
PPs (Tennberg, 2000). The discussion about the actual 
representativeness of PPs was also raised by Håken Nilson 
(1997) from the Norwegian Polar Institute in his study of 
the AEPS and its working groups (Nilson, 1997). During 
the AEPS meeting in Norway in 1997, Nilson’s (1997) 
report was attacked by the ICC (English, 2013). His report 
included the questions “How representative are the three 
IPO Permanent Participants?” and “Have they squeezed 
out other Arctic stakeholders, have they taken over the 
agendas of other groups?” (Nilson, 1997:49). In response to 
Nilson’s questions, the Canadian and Danish/Greenlandic 
delegations supported the ICC and the existing PPs 
(English, 2013). The minutes of the meeting reported that 
“the questions from the consultant had been a mistake,” 
and it was noted that they had not been sent to Canadian 
officials (English, 2013:246). 
The ICC suggested that the number of Indigenous 
organizations in the AC should be finite even though many 
more organizations were interested in being involved as 
PPs (Tennberg, 2000). According to the declaration on 
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the establishment of the AC, the number of PPs cannot 
be more than the number of states (Tennberg, 2000). In 
the beginning of international cooperation among the 
Arctic states, only three Indigenous organizations had 
PP status, but subsequently the list was extended by the 
admission of the Aleut International Association (1998), 
the Arctic Athabaskan Council, and the Gwich’in Council 
International (2000) (Tennberg, 2000; English, 2013; 
Knecht, 2017). 
The literature has also noted that Indigenous actors are 
very dependent on their domestic governments both legally 
and financially (Tennberg, 2000; Wilson and Øverland, 
2007; Ingimundarson, 2014). Tennberg (2009) claims that 
Indigenous organizations in the Arctic formed a political 
agency that is based on power relations between states 
and Indigenous groups. Indigenous nationalism is limited 
by the principles and concepts of sovereignty, statehood, 
and Indigenous rights of self-determination (Loukacheva, 
2007). By using coercion, states can affect the activities of 
Indigenous organizations. In 2012, the Russian government 
suspended the activities of RAIPON for one year; in 
another case, the Greenlandic government boycotted the 
AC because it did not receive full access to the 2013 Kiruna 
Ministerial Meeting (Byers, 2013; Ingimundarson, 2014). 
Indigenous organizations and state actors are unequal 
in terms of their participation. Unlike states, PPs do not 
have the right to vote, so their effectiveness is based on 
the concept of influence (Wilson and Øverland, 2007). 
According to Wilson and Øverland (2007), the inclusion 
of PPs in the AC provided the opportunity for states and 
Indigenous organizations to cooperate, but Indigenous 
interests have not been considered by the states. Similarly, 
Spence (2017) argues that the balance of power in the AC 
benefits states. States have the ability to decide what issues 
will be put on the agenda, and when in the process other 
actors can contribute (Spence, 2017). 
These two political phenomena observed in the AC, the 
lack of full representation among PPs and the dependency 
of Indigenous organizations on state actors, are interrelated. 
The question of what particular Indigenous nation is eligible 
to be represented as a PP was unclear since the beginning of 
discussions on Indigenous participation in the AC (English, 
2013). As English (2013) notes, during the Rovaniemi 
meeting in 1989, the Russian and the American delegations 
expressed strongly their confusion about Indigenous 
representation. At that moment, the Arctic Indigenous 
groups in Russia were not organized, and only some of 
them associated themselves with the ICC. Similarly, Inuit 
represented only some Alaska Natives (English, 2013). 
The lack of a clear concept of who is Indigenous in the AC 
meant that member states were left to establish legal and 
political Indigenous status (Tennberg, 2000). According to 
Tennberg (2000), the legal definitions of Indigenous groups 
in national legislations were inherited by international law-
making processes in the Arctic. 
Meanwhile, in comparison with that of state actors, the 
level of participation of non-state actors in the AC, including 
observers and PPs, is much lower (Knecht, 2017). Given the 
fact that the contribution of PPs is vital to discussions on 
changing Arctic conditions and traditional knowledge, the 
AC needs to discuss Indigenous representation as well as 
the degree of participation and commitment of other non-
Arctic actors (Knecht, 2017). The participation of PPs 
makes the AC unique among international governmental 
organizations (Gamble and Shadian, 2017). By including 
Indigenous peoples in international decision-making 
processes, the AC contributed to international regime-
building (Gamble and Shadian, 2017). 
An institutional reform of the AC to solve this problem 
of underrepresentation could involve a reconsideration of 
the legal concept of indigeneity. Because Indigenous legal 
and political identities are defined by national legislations 
of state-members, they differ significantly from each other. 
A formal, legal description of indigeneity established 
by global transnational organizations defines Indigenous 
groups as “descendants of peoples who had inhabited the 
lands prior to colonization or conquest; their language 
and cultures are separate from national languages/culture 
of their countries” (Martinez-Cobo, 1982; UN Working 
Group on Indigenous Peoples, 1983; International Labor 
Organization, 1989; World Bank, 1991). However, as is clear 
in the example of Russia discussed below, not all Indigenous 
groups in the North are recognized legally as Indigenous. 
The institution of PPs was created to involve Indigenous 
communities in the discussion of important issues, such as 
environmental protection. The AC should reconsider the 
requirements and criteria for PPs by making them more 
flexible and inclusive of other Indigenous groups.
VOICELESS:
OUTCOMES OF A DISTINCT RUSSIAN INDIGENEITY
Territorial remoteness of circumpolar nations caused 
relatively late legal recognition of indigeneity in both 
Russia and North America. However, the conceptions 
of indigeneity of the North American Arctic Indigenous 
groups and the Russian northern Indigenous groups moved 
in quite different directions. Because of the radically 
distinct political ideologies and legal systems, the original 
peoples of Siberia and Arctic North America understand 
their indigeneity differently. As Table 1 shows, Russian and 
North American indigeneities have separate components 
that make their Indigenous status distinct. 
The most significant difference in this comparison is 
the lack of recognition of Indigenous title in Russia. By 
admitting that Indigenous groups of Canada and the United 
States have the right to claim their lands, the American 
and Canadian governments agreed that European settlers 
colonized lands previously occupied by Indigenous groups 
(Zellen, 2008; Case and Voluck, 2012; Alcantara, 2013). 
The colonization of North America was much faster and 
more noticeable than in northeastern Europe or eastern 
Russia (Keskitalo, 2004; Øverland, 2009). 
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In Russia, the Soviet government framed the legal concept 
of indigeneity with the intention of helping “backward” 
northern communities find their path to communism 
(Slezkine, 1994:421). Thus, the Soviet and then Russian 
governments were guided by the idea of protecting small 
nations from extinction (Slezkine, 1994), but they have never 
officially recognized the fact of colonization of their lands. 
Because of the lack of recognition of Aboriginal title by the 
Russians, Indigenous autonomies in the USSR/Russia were 
the product of the Soviet government and its ideology, and 
were not created as a result of land claim movements. 
As Coulthard argues (2014), Indigenous-state relations 
are determined by the structure of domination. The voices 
of Indigenous groups are excluded from the legal and 
political systems of governance, so state actors use their 
power to determine the rights of Indigenous groups. The 
influence of state power can also be applied to the definition 
of indigeneity. In the legal and political sense, indigeneity is 
determined by domestic governments of states (Coulthard, 
2014), so governments have the right to decide whom 
they want to see as Indigenous. The Russian government 
did not recognize the colonization of Siberia and the Far 
East of Russia, areas that were conquered during a slow 
and incremental process (Øverland, 2009). Unlike North 
America, Russia has seen Indigenous groups as small 
nations, people who need to be protected by the government 
(Pika, 1999). Indigenous groups not categorized as small-
numbered were considered “national minorities,” e.g., non-
ethnic Russians (Laruelle, 2013:37).
 The particular understanding and origins of indigeneity 
in Russia may lead to consequences that could significantly 
affect the discussion of Indigenous issues in the Arctic. 
Policymakers and other actors in the Arctic anticipate 
TABLE 1. Comparison of the legal conceptions of indigeneity in northern Canada, Alaska, and the Russian Far North.
Russia
 • 1822 (Speransky’s Decree) (all 
Indigenous groups);
 • 1926 – Statute about small-
numbered Indigenous peoples
 • The necessity of governance over 
all non-Slavic populations
 • Threat of attack from the Asian 
part of Russia
 • New ethnic policy of the 
Bolsheviks
 • 1822 – no special protection was 
designed
 • 1926 – protection and special status 
for small-numbered groups due to 
their backwardness
 • Indigenous title has never been 
recognized
 • Indigenous autonomies (public 
governments) created as a result of 
korenizatsiia policy in the 1920s
United States (Alaska)
 • 1936 – Indian Reorganization Act 
(IRA)
 • Improvement in socioeconomic 
conditions of Indigenous groups 
(the IRA)
 • Alaska Natives obtained 
equal status with Indigenous 
Americans 
 • IRA ended the breakup of 
reservations and allotment of lands 
and encouraged tribes to adopt 
constitutions for self-government
 • The Alaska Indigenous Claims 
Settlement Act (1971) settled the 
land claims of Alaska Natives
Canada
 • 1933 – Re Eskimos
 • Canada’s look to the North
 • Early reports of missionaries about 
miserable conditions among the 
Inuit.
 • Inuit recognized as equal to 
Indigenous groups in Canada
 • The process of decolonization after 
the Second World War
 • 1944 – the Family Allowance 
program
 • Indigenous title recognized by the 
Calder decision
 • Nunavut (public government) 
created in 1999 as a result of land 
claim negotiations
Historical overview of 
Indigenous recognition
Time of recognition
Reason for recognition
Governmental protection
Recognition of Indigenous 
title and the right to autonomy
that the Russian understanding of indigeneity may create 
a situation in which not all Indigenous peoples in the 
Arctic are represented in the AC. Population increase may 
cause the loss of Indigenous status among small Arctic 
Indigenous groups. By becoming a larger Indigenous 
nation, some of the Arctic Indigenous minorities such as 
the Nenets could officially lose their Indigenous status. The 
loss of Indigenous status means that some of the former 
small groups will be excluded from RAIPON, and their 
representatives will no longer be able to participate in the 
AC as a part of the RAIPON.
The Russian legal conception of circumpolar 
indigeneity may also lead to positive political outcomes 
for the AC. Because of the historically derived principle 
of political autonomy and a large political representation 
among larger Indigenous nations, there is more access 
for Indigenous groups to participate in local decision-
making processes. Because some regions have both larger 
and smaller Indigenous groups and are governed by the 
majority of Indigenous groups in the Parliament, this is a 
good opportunity for those nations who are represented in 
politics to advocate for Indigenous rights.
How do differences in the understanding of indigeneity 
in Russia and North America affect the AC? The AC 
should reconsider its formal requirements for the inclusion 
of Indigenous groups as PPs. The RAIPON represents 
only smaller Russian Indigenous groups, excluding larger 
Indigenous groups. Meanwhile, including larger Indigenous 
groups of the Arctic such as Sakha and Komi can bring new 
ideas and perspectives to the discussion of Indigenous and 
environmental issues. Indigenous groups from northern 
Russia who are not represented by RAIPON also have 
more political experience governing their regions, and they 
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can affect the political decisions made in those areas. At 
this moment, Sakha and Komi are voiceless in the Arctic 
Council, but their inclusion as PPs could improve the 
political participation of Indigenous groups in the Arctic.
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